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Using Both Sociological and 
Economic Incentives to 
Reduce Moral Hazard 
Francisca G.-C. Richter, Edgar F. Pebe Diaz, 
B. Wade Brorsen, and Kevin Currier 
Economists tend to focus on monetary incentives. In the model developed here, both 
sociological and economic incentives are used to diminish the apparent moral hazard 
problem existing in commodity grading. Training that promotes graders' response 
to sociological incentives is shown to increase expected benefits. The model suggests 
this training be increased up to the point where the marginal benefit due to training 
equals its marginal cost. It may be more economical to influence the grader's behavior 
by creating cognitive dissonance through training and rules rather than by using 
economic incentives alone. 
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Introduction 
Today more than ever, agricultural processors demand commodities that meet strict 
quality standards and, furthermore, commodities that have been accurately graded by 
quality. Processors seem more aware of the detriments of quality uncertainty. In a study 
of international grain markets, Wilson and Dahl found quality uncertainty can increase 
costs for buyers, processors, and grain handlers. Quality grades can also affect sorting 
and blending strategies. 
Recent studies by Kenkel and Anderson in wheat and Pebe Diaz in peanuts have 
reported inaccuracy in grading due to graders not following directions. Brorsen, Grant, 
and Rister also found that hedonic prices for rice varied across locations due to differ- 
ences in graders. Some graders do not follow official grading procedures because their 
individual incentives differ from those of the grading agency. 
Economists have focused mainly on whether grading standards accurately measure 
the economic value of the commodity (e.g., Hennessy and Wahl; Adam, Kenkel, and 
Anderson). Scientists in other disciplines have examined the physical measurement of 
quality factors (Powell, Sheppard, and Dowell), but no research has been conducted on 
the incentives faced by individual graders. 
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A principal-agent model is developed here to explain how both economic and socio- 
logical incentives can lead to improving the grading procedure. Principal-agent models 
are commonly used to determine the form of optimal contracts (e.g., Wu and Babcock; 
Lajili et  al.; Allen and Lueck). The power of sociological incentives can be increased 
by training programs emphasizing the cost of not following directions and by admin- 
istering psychological tests designed to identify graders who are prone to rule-following 
behavior. 
The grader is assumed to be motivated by sociological incentives such as recognition 
and praise which add to the subjective or psychic income (increasing self-esteem) arising 
from doing a good job. According to neoclassical theory, the grader maximizes expected 
utility. The grader, as a rational economic agent, is motivated by economic incentives 
such as increased wage income and more hours of leisure. In addition to the economic 
incentives, nonmonetary, sociological incentives may also influence the grader's utility. 
Moral Hazard in Grading 
Standard agency theory deals with asymmetries of information that develop after the 
signing of a contract. Two types of informational problems arise: those resulting from 
hidden actions, and those resulting from hidden information (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green). Hidden action is the problem considered here. An example of the hidden action 
case, also known as moral hazard,' is illustrated by the inability of U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's FederallState Inspection Service (hereafter denoted simply as USDA) to 
know the real capabilities of the grader or to observe whether the grader precisely follows 
grading procedures-i.e., the grader's effort levels are not observable. Hence, the USDA 
has an informational disadvantage. This problem is referred to as "nonobservability" in 
contract theory (Strausz). 
The primary difficulty within the grading procedure is the existence of a moral hazard 
problem, which involves an incentive conflict between the USDA (principal) and the 
grader (agent). The grader is assumed to control an action that is normally interpreted 
as effort level. Following Strausz, the incentive problem is characterized as follows. The 
grader dislikes performing effort, but the USDA may need the grader to apply high 
effort because it tends to improve grading accuracy. While output, or grading accuracy, 
depends on the grader's effort, it is not solely determined by this effort. Consequently, 
the USDA and the grader can only contract on general grading services, and the need 
for monitoring arises. 
Under the USDA operational structure for peanut grading, the FederallState Area 
Supervisor is responsible for monitoring the grader's actions in an assigned territory. 
At any time, the supervisor can analyze a nongraded sample from a lot that has been 
graded, and track the individual graders who worked on the lot. However, the process 
of monitoring and supervision is costly-a factor likely explaining why monitoring is not 
used extensively. 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (see p. 477, footnote) point out that the literature's use of the term "moral hazard" is 
not entirely uniform. Also, for earlier moral hazard models, see Holmstrom; Shavell; Mirrless; and Grossman and Hart. For 
more information on recent developments in moral hazard models, see Prescott. 
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Social Norms Rewards, 
and Internal and External Sanctions 
Coleman argues that tools such as social norms and internal and external sanctions 
could be useful in explaining micro-level social problems. With an internal sanction, the 
grader must internalize a norm, such as following grading manuals precisely. Formal 
training programs (workshops, seminars, conferences) are important means for convin- 
cing graders to internalize the norm.2 Internal sanctions can be either positive or 
negative-the grader will feel internally rewarded for generating precise grades, or will 
feel internally punished (i.e., feel guilty) for not following directions. External sanctions 
can range from those damaging or enhancing prestige to those providing economic bene- 
fits. These sanctions directly affect the grader's utility. For example, when the USDA 
supervisor gives the grader a verbal reprimand for using improper sampling procedures, 
the USDA is employing an external sanction. 
The nonmonetary effects on utility from both external and internal sanctions are 
called "psychic income." The USDA may decide to implement a strategy based on 
training, auditing, and incentives deriving from internal andfor external sanctions to 
induce the grader to apply high effort levels. The model presented below extends the 
classical moral hazard model to include training and social norms. 
The Model 
The USDA, acting as a risk-neutral principal in the model, wants to maximize benefits. 
A grader (the agent) is temporarily hired to perform grading services, and produces out- 
put 0. In this model, output is a measure of the level of grading inaccuracy, so less output 
is preferred to more. 
As a consequence of the USDA's inability to observe the grader's effort, a moral 
hazard situation is created, bringing about a welfare loss. Our objective is to analyze 
whether or not psychic income, in combination with current monetary incentives, may 
reduce this welfare loss. 
For simplicity, assume the grader can only take one of two effort levels: eL the low 
effort level, and e, the high effort level, with e, > e,. The USDA can implement a train- 
ing program aimed at strengthening in graders an internal sanctioning system which 
induces an increase in graders' psychic income whenever they do a good job. Training 
at level t is performed a t  the beginning of the season and carries a one-time cost of c(t). 
Denote by dH(t) the disutility of high effort, and by dL(t) the disutility of low effort. Effort 
creates disutility in the agent, dH(t) > dL(t). 
In the model, training directly affects the grader's disutility of effort by strengthening 
the grader's internal sanctioning (positive and negative) system. The higher the training 
level, the lower the disutility of exerting a high effort level, ddH(t)ldt < 0. Also, training 
increases the disutility of exerting low effort levels, so adL(t)ldt > 0. 
To construct the USDA's benefit function, let f (0) be the monetary value of grading 
inaccuracy, and p(0) be the monetary payment to the grader, where af(0)la0 < 0 and 
ap(0)la0 < 0. The USDA's benefit function is then f (0) -p(0) - c(t), and the grader's utility 
In conversations with graders, some told us they considered following certain details of grading manuals to be unimpor- 
tant. This suggests some training programs have failed to convince graders of the importance of internalizing the norm. 
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function is u(p(0)) + d(t), where u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with 
u'(p(0)) strictly decreasing inp. 
To further simplify the model, assume output 0, the inaccuracy-in-grading measure, 
can take only discrete values in a finite range. The set of possible values for 0 is 
{0,, ..., 0,). Also, recall that the USDA cannot precisely infer from the value of 0 the effort 
level exerted by the grader. However, by monitoring and supervising, the USDA can 
estimate the probability distribution of outcome 0 given a certain effort level. Let {IT,] 
be the probability distribution of 0 given H (high effort), and IniL} be the probability 
distribution of 0 given L (low effort). Also, because 0 is discrete, the monetary payment 
to the grader, p(0), and the function, f (0), will also be discrete. The following notation 
is used:p, =p(Oi) and& = f(Oi), i = 1 ,..., n. 
When Effort Is Observable 
With these variables defined, the problem is formulated where effort can be obsemed 
and graders are not trained, because the solution to this problem will be used to solve 
for the nonobsemability-of-effort case with training. The USDA is assumed risk neutral, 
and thus its goal is to maximize expected benefits. One alternative to the risk-averse, 
effort-averse grader is to not accept the contract. If so, the grader gets utility u. Hence, 
the grader must receive at  least hidher resemation utility level u to accept the contract. 
This is known as the participation or individual rationality constraint. 
The optimization problem, which is denoted Problem 1, is written as: 
st.: C u(pi)IIie - de > ii, e E {L, HI, 
i = l  
where 11, is the probability of ei occurring when effort e is applied, de is the disutility of 
effort level e, and e can take values H (high) and L (low). 
Problems of this type may be solved in two stages. The problem is solved first with 
low, and then with high effort. Then maximized benefits are compared for these two solu- 
tions, and the effort level is chosen a~cordingly.~ 
Note that the participation constraint is binding at the optimum. To see this, assume 
the payment scheme {pi] is a solution to (I) ,  but the constraint is not binding (the 
expected utility is strictly larger than the reservation utility). Then, a slightly smaller 
expected utility (p;, smaller thanpj for some j )  would also satisfy the constraint and a t  
the same time yield a higher expected benefit for the USDA. This outcome contradicts 
the fact that {pi] solves (1). 
With a fixed level of effort, the Lagrangian for this problem and the first-order condi- 
tions are: 
For a complete treatment of the typical principal-agent problem, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene (chapter 14, 
section B). 
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The grader is risk averse, and ut(pi) is strictly decreasing inp  for all i. Therefore, (3) 
implies payments to the grader are constant for all i. With fxed payments, the partici- 
pation constraint at  the optimum becomes: 
where p * denotes the fxed optimum payment, and e* is the optimum effort level. This 
participation constraint leads to payments of the form: 
USDA's maximum expected benefits, as a function of effort, are: 
Thus, the solution to this problem is obtained by finding the effort level e * that maxi- 
mizes (6) and pays the grader a fured wage p*. Intuitively, fxed wages, or no incentives, 
make sense because of the attitudes toward risk of both parties, and because effort is 
observable and can be specified in the contract. 
When Effort Is  Not Observable 
Now introduce training and assume effort is not observable. The problem can be stated 
as follows: 
n 
max C (fi -pi> Die- - 4 th  
Pi i = l  
n 
s.t.: C u(pi)IIie. - de*(t) > ii, 
i= l  
n 
e * solves max C u(p,>II, - d e(t). 
e i= l  
The second constraint is called the incentive compatibility constraint because, if 
satisfied, the grader's incentives become compatible with those of the USDA. The grader 
finds it optimal to exert the effort level desired by the USDA. 
Again, the problem is analyzed in two stages. First, consider the problem with low 
effort and zero training (t = 0), denoted Problem 2. The solution to this problem will be 
to pay the grader a fixed wage of 
To show this, note that (8) is the payment a grader would receive for the low-effort case 
when effort is observable [see (5)l. Because payments do not depend on the effort level 
(they are fured), the grader will choose the level of effort that brings about the lowest 
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disutility, while at  the same time allowing the grader to earn hisher reservation utility. 
Also note that Problem 2 is actually Problem 1 with an added restriction. Therefore, a 
solution to Problem 2 can never obtain a higher maximum than a solution to Problem 1. 
Thus, payments as in (8) solve Problem 2. If training were added (t > O), payments and 
costs would only increase (recall the disutility of low effort increases with training), and 
so zero training with (8) solves the low-effort case. 
Now, consider the high-effort case with training. The problem was initially formu- 
lated with two choice variables, the monetary payment schedule (p) and the training 
level (t). An alternative is to have onlyp as a choice variable, leaving t as a parameter, 
and then perform comparative statistics on the optimized function by varying t. This 
latter approach was chosen because i t  allows a more intuitive understanding of the 
problem. So, for a fixed training level t, the model can be formulated as maximizing 
expected net benefit (EB): 
Specifically, find the optimal payment scheme that will maximize the USDA's expected 
net benefit by inducing the grader to exert high effort. The first constraint is the parti- 
cipation constraint and the second is the incentive compatibility constraint. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is expressed as: 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are obtained by differentiating (10) with respect 
to each p to obtain: 
where A; > 0, AH > 0. 
The set of equations in (11) indicates the optimum monetary payment will depend on 
the likelihood ratio n,/n,. The likelihood ratio is the ratio of probabilities of obtaining 
outcome (error in grading) i, given low and high efforts. Thus, for low outcome levels, 
it is desirable that the likelihood ratio be small. This would imply the grader is more 
likely to make only a few errors when exerting high as compared to low effort. Likewise, 
a large outcome level should be associated with a large likelihood-ratio value because 
a large amount of errors in grading should be associated with low effort as compared to 
high effort (figure 1). Monitoring will allow obtaining a better estimate of this ratio, and 
thus it will determine how closely the solution is approximated. 
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Note: Although it is desirable that be monotonic (monotonic likelihood-ratio property), 
this may not always be the case. 
Figure 1. The likelihood ratio as an increasing function of 
grading inaccuracy 
Let us examine why both Lagrangian multipliers are greater than zero. If A; were 
zero, a fixed-wage solution would result and the grader would perform at low effort, 
which is undesirable. On the other hand, A', equal to zero could lead to u'(p) being nega- 
tive (if niL/na > 11, which violates our assumption about the grader's utility function. 
If in fact the likelihood ratio is small for small i's (fewer errors in grading) and large 
for large i's (more grading errors), from (11) and because ul(p) is decreasing, payments 
to the grader will be larger with fewer errors and smaller with more errors. This vari- 
ability in payments and a risk-averse grader translate into higher expected payments 
to the grader as compared to the observable case, in order to achieve the same expected 
utility level of c. In other words, because the payment scheme introduces risk, the grader 
will need to be compensated with higher average payments. 
To observe this, note that for the risk-averse grader, the utility of expected payments 
(u(Ep)) is strictly greater than the expected utility of payments: u(Ep) > Zr=, u(pi)niH. 
Because 3Ll is binding, Zr=, u(pi)niH = ii + d H(t) holds. Therefore, Ep > u -'(ii + dH(t)), where 
the last term is the fixed optimum payment when effort is observable as in (5). 
So far, results can be summarized as follows. When the USDA finds it optimal to in- 
duce low effort, payments to the grader will be fured and equal to the payments graders 
would receive if efforts were obsemable and low effort were optimal. No training would 
be necessary, and no welfare loss would occur. However, if the USDA finds it optimal 
to induce high effort in graders, payments will no longer be fured; rather, they will be 
characterized by (11). Higher expected payments to the grader are needed to induce 
high-effort performance when effort is nonobservable. Thus, there will be a welfare loss 
as compared to the effort-observable case. 
Now, to determine if training can decrease this loss, we analyze how training affects 
the USDA's optimized level of expected net benefit, EB*. Comparative statics are obtained 
on the optimized Lagrangian, using the envelope theorem: 
Training will increase the optimized expected net benefit for the USDA as long as the 
expression in (12) is positive. Given the assumptions on the disutility functions, the first 
term is negative, and the second and third terms are positive. To interpret (12), consider 
the following comparative statics: 
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and 
Derivatives (13) and (14) may be interpreted as the "ceteris paribus" effect of a change 
in the disutility functions a t  high and low effort levels, respectively, on the optimized 
expected net benefit. More explicitly, if the disutility of high effort can be decreased 
(possibly through training), expected net benefit to the USDA will increase [see (13)l. 
Likewise, if the disutility of performing low effort increases (through training), expected 
net benefit will also increase [see (14)l. 
A first look a t  these expressions might suggest i t  is more beneficial to invest in 
training that will positively reinforce the norm, as in (131, than to train toward strength- 
ening internal sanctions in the grader, as in (14). However, the cost of both types of 
training ought to be considered, as  well as  the relative magnitude of the Lagrange 
multipliers. 
Returning to expression (12), replace (13) and (14) in (12). Training will increase max- 
imized net benefit as long as: 
giving the classical result that training should be increased up to the point where the 
marginal cost of training equals the expected marginal benefit from training. Hence, 
when high effort is optimal for the USDA, the welfare loss occurring due to nonobserv- 
ability of effort might be lessened with training as defined here. 
In peanut grading, where monitoring is limited, graders have been observed to exert 
low effort levels (Pebe Diaz). In the context of the above model, the incentive compati- 
bility constraint seems not to hold. This result could mean the USDA finds low effort 
optimal, or it could indicate the USDA is operating inefficiently. In peanut grading, the 
USDA is relying heavily on internal sanctions to obtain the desired result, and in some 
cases this has not been sufficient. Implementing training programs that strengthen 
internal sanctions and increased monitoring in combination with external sanctions are 
possible solutions to the incentive problems in peanut grading. Also, Pebe Diaz et al. 
argue that the peanut grading procedure could be redesigned whereby the disutility of 
high effort would be less. 
The reasons for inaccurate grading in wheat are different from those observed in 
peanut grading. In wheat, the principals (elevators) have developed an asymmetric 
objective function which has large penalties for underestimating quality. In Oklahoma, 
an extension education program directed to farmers and elevator managers regarding 
the importance of accurate grading resulted in a change in the objective function, which 
in turn has caused more accurate grading of wheat. Because the sampling and grading 
rules for wheat are easier to follow than those for  peanut^,^ the incentive compatibility 
constraint appears to be violated rarely. 
With peanuts, proper sampling takes about 15 minutes, and the grader is to rotate among a set of sampling patterns. A 
peanut grader also has an incentive to start with an overweight sample to reduce the probability ofhaving to regrade (Pebe 
Diaz et al.). 
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Conclusions 
A theoretical framework was developed to explain the incentives faced by graders. 
Previous moral hazard models have not considered both sociological and economic 
incentives. A training-monitoring strategy was analyzed under a moral hazard setting 
where the USDA (FederaVState Inspection Service) was the principal and the grader 
was the agent. Nonmonetary incentives or psychic income due to praise, and internal 
or external sanctions in the grader's expected utility function were included. Payments 
to the grader are dependent on the likelihood of inefficiency at different effort levels, 
which is estimated through monitoring. 
Results of the model suggest the USDA should consider using training to create 
internal sanctions as an alternative to using monetary incentives alone. Training is 
shown to increase optimal expected benefits. The model indicates training should be 
increased to the point where the expected marginal benefit due to training equals its 
marginal cost. The USDA may find it more economical to influence the grader's behavior 
through training and rules rather than by using economic incentives alone. Formal 
training programs for graders should aim at having graders internalize grading norms, 
thereby creating awareness of the problems derived from not following instructions. 
[Received September 2001;final received Februaly 2003.1 
References 
Adam, B. D., P. Kenkel, and K. Anderson. "Economics of Cleaning Wheat." J. Agr. and Resour. Econ. 
19(1994):280-98. 
Allen, D. W., and D. Lueck. "Searching for Ratchet Effects in Agricultural Contracts." J. Agr. and 
Resour. Econ. 24(1999):536-52. 
Brorsen, B. W., W. R. Grant, and M. E. Rister. "Economic Values of Rice Quality Factors." Pub. No. 
PR-4202, Texas Agr. Exp. Sta., Texas A&M University, June 1984. 
Coleman, J. S. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Hamard University 
Press, 1990. 
Grossman, S. J., and 0. D. Hart. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem." Econometrica 51(1983): 
7 4 6 .  
Hennessy, D. A., and T. Wahl. "Discount Schedules and Grower Incentives in Grain Marketing."Amer. 
J. Agr. Econ. 79(1997):888-901. 
Holmstrom, B. "Moral Hazard and Obsemability." Bell J. Econ. 10(1979):74-91. 
Kenkel, P., and K. Anderson. "Who Wins, Who Loses? Report on OSU Study on Grain Grading 
Accuracy." Oklahoma Current Farm Economics 69(1996):27-36. 
Lajili, K., P. J. Barry, S. T. Sonka, and J. T. Mahoney. "Farmers' Preferences for Crop Contracts." J. 
Agr. and Resour. Econ. 22(1997):264-80. 
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Greene. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University 
Press, Inc., 1995. 
Mirrless, J. "The Implications of Moral Hazard for Optimal Insurance." Presentation at  conference in 
honor of Karl Borch, Nuffield College, Bergen, Norway, 1979. 
Pebe Diaz, E. F. "Refining the U.S. Peanut Grading System." Unpub. Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State 
University, December 1999. 
Pebe Diaz, E. F., B. W. Brorsen, K. B. Anderson, and P. Kenkel. "Effects of Overweight Samples and 
Rounding of Grade Percentages on Peanut Grades and Prices." Peanut Science 28(2001):9-12. 
Powell, J. H., Jr., H. T. Sheppard, and F. E. Dowell. "An Automated Data Collection System for Use in 
Grading of Farmers' Stock Peanuts." Paper presented at  the 1994 International Winter Meeting spon- 
sored by American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE), Atlanta GA, 13-16 December 1994. 
Richter et al. Sociological and Economic Incentives to Reduce Moral Hazard 373 
Prescott, E. S. "A Primer on Moral-Hazard Models." Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic 
Quarterly 85(1999):47-77. 
Shavell, S. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship." Bell J. Econ. 
10(1979):55-73. 
Strausz, R. On Incentives and Asymmetric Information in Organizations. Aachen, Berlin: Shaker 
Verlag, 1998. 
Wilson, W. W., and B. L. Dahl. "Quality Uncertainty in International Grain Markets: Analytical and 
Competitive Issues." Rev. Agr. Econ. 21(1999):209-24. 
Wu, J.-J., and B. A. Babcock. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asym- 
metric Information." J. Agr. and Resour. Econ. 20(1995):31&27. 
